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QtTESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is a man who purposely places himself near the center of a
national media event and then exploits that experience for
his own personal gain a limited purpose public figure for
discussions regarding that national media event?

2.

Do Globe's First Amendment rights require recognition of a
constitutionally-based privilege of neutral reportage?

3.

Does actual malice sufficient to support punitive damages
require more than a mere failure to discover the falsity of
an accusation?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KHALID KHAWAR,

)

No. S054868

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

V.
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

globe

Defendant and

Appellant.

Court of Appeal
Case No. B08489
Los Angeles
County Superior
Court Case No.
WEC 139685

-)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On March 14,

1990, Khalid Iqbal Khawar (Khawar)

second amended complaint against Globe International,
(Globe)

seeking damages for defamation.

trial the jury found that:
article defamed Khawar;
Khawar were false;

(C.A.T. 137-41.)

After

(2) some statements in the article about

(3) Globe was negligent in failing to learn of

cause of injury to Khawar;
1989;

Inc.

(1) some statements in the Globe

the false facts before publication;

April,

filed his

(4) Globe's negligence was a

(5) Khawar was a private figure as of

(6) Globe's article was an accurate and neutral

report of the charges made in Morrow's book. The Senator Must
Die; and (7) Globe published the article with actual malice.
(C.A.T.

2780-82.)

private figure.

The trial judge agreed that Khawar was a
(R.T. 2735.)

The trial judge disagreed with the

jury, however, and ruled that Globe's article was not an accurate
and neutral report of Morrow's book.

1

(R.T. 2740.)

The jury assessed damages totaling $675,000 against Globe
for harm to Khawar's reputation,
presumed damages.

for emotional distress,

(C.A.T. 2783.)

and for

In a separate trial phase,

jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.

the

(C.A.T. 2791.)

Globe filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
(C.A.T. 3130.)

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.

formerly published at Khawar v. Globe Int'1^—Inc^,
2d 92,

111

(1996).

private figure;

The court held that:

(2)

See

54 Cal. Rptr.

(1) Khawar was a

there was substantial evidence to support a

finding of actual malice by Globe; and (3) California has not
adopted the neutral reportage privilege with regard to private
figures.

^

at 99-106.

This Court then granted review.

Statement of Facts
On June 4,

1968,

Khalid Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel,

obtained a press pass, and went to the Embassy room where the
campaign for Robert Kennedy was located.

(R.T.

1338.)

Khawar

wanted his picture taken with Kennedy so he gave his camera to a
friend and got up on stage to stake out a position near where
Kennedy would speak.

(R.T.

1340,

1389-90.)

The room was full of

reporters and Khawar knew that he was likely to be in the photos
that the reporters took of Kennedy.
1389,

1390-91.)

(R.T.

1339,

1345,

1348,

Kennedy was killed soon after he left the

Embassy room around midnight.

(R.T. 1341.)

Khawar hung the picture of himself with Kennedy in his
office.

(R.T. 1357.)

Khawar placed the photo where anyone

meeting him in his office could see it.

(R.T.

1358.)

At least

two thousand people saw the picture of Khawar with Kennedy.
(R.T. 1359.)

The picture hung next to a photo of Khawar with

President Zia of Pakistan.

(R.T.

2

1358,

1422.)

In 1989, Globe published an article entitled "Former CIA
Agent Claims:

(C.T.

3144-45.)

Iranians Killed Bobby Kennedy for the Mafia."

The article was written by John Blackburn, a

reporter for Globe.
Robert Morrow,
93.)

(R.T. 1089-90.)

Blackburn had interviewed

the author of The Senator Must Die.^

(R.T. 1092-

Blackburn's article was based on the issues discussed in

Morrow's book.

(R.T. 1090-93, 1101-09.)

Morrow has written two other books on the assassinations of
political leaders.

(R.T, 704, 841, 883.)

ran for congress in Maryland.

In addition, Morrow

(R.T, 883-84.)

Moreover, Morrow

provided information to United States Congressman Downing which
helped to create the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
(R.T.

1600.)
The Globe article detailed Morrow's accusations that Sirhan

Sirhan had not fired the fatal shots, but rather that a man
called Ali Ahmand was the actual killer.'^

(C.T. 3145.)

In his

book, Morrow pointed to Khawar in a photo of him standing near
Kennedy,

and indicated that Khawar was Ali Ahmand.

(C.A.T. 156.)

Morrow did not name Khalid Khawar in his book, but wrote
only that Ali Ahmand was also known as Khalid Iqbal.
1123.)

(R.T.

During interviews with the FBI and LAPD, Khawar did not

give his name as Khalid Khawar, but instead as Khalid Iqbal.
(R.T. 1381,

1383.)

Blackburn tried to locate Ali Ahmand through

the Los Angeles telephone directory, but was unsuccessful.

(R.T.

1120-21.)

^ Blac)cburn was unsure if he interviewed or tried to interview other
people related to the story.
(R.T. 1123, 1127, 1140.)
As Khawar's own expert testified, the article was riddled with
disclaiming phrases informing readers that Globe was not concurring
with, but only reporting upon, Morrow's accusations.
(R.T. 859-63.)
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In April of 1989, a former employee told Khawar about the
Globe article.

(R.T. 1357.)

Khawar received phone threats,

his house and car were egged.

(R.T.

1367,

a suit for defamation five months later.

1378-80.)
(R.T.

and

Khawar filed

1368.)

Approximately six months after the story was published, Khawar
appeared on a local television program and denied Morrow's
allegations.

{R.T.

1398,

1400.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Khawar should be classified as a limited purpose public
figure for the purposes of reporting on the assassination of
Robert Kennedy.

Khawar chose to stand near Kennedy so he could

get his picture taken with him.

Khawar used that same picture

for nearly twenty years in his dealings with people in his
office.

Khawar used his voluntary interaction in a public matter

for his own benefit.

Khawar's actions were an assumption of risk

for any negative consequences from public discussion of the
event.

Furthermore,

the First Amendment purpose of protecting

discussion on matters of public concern warrants finding Khawar
to be a limited purpose public figure.
The court below violated Globe's First Amendment rights by
refusing to recognize a neutral reportage privilege that would
shield Globe from liability under the facts of this case.

Globe

proposes a formulation of the neutral reportage privilege that
comports with current Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence,
protects only that type of speech deserving of First Amendment
protection, and provides the reputational interests of plaintiffs
like Khawar a reasonable degree of protection.

For these

reasons, Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege
ameliorates the concerns of courts that have rejected other

4

of the privilege.

Finally, Globe met every

j,gq^ijfement necessary to invoke its formulation of the neutral
reportage privilege.
There is insufficient evidence for a finding of actual
malice by Globe.

Even though John Blackburn may not have been a

credible witness, a jury may not infer subjective knowledge of
falsity because they do not believe his assertions of ignorance
as to the falsity of Morrow's allegations.

Additionally, Globe's

failure to investigate is not evidence of actual malice because
Globe did not fail to investigate evidence which they knew of, or
had been provided.

Globe's failure to locate Khawar is not

purposeful avoidance of falsity because Khawar's true name was
unknown to Globe at the time of publication.

Therefore, punitive

damages are unwarranted in this case.

ARGUMENT
I.

khawar is a public figure for the purposes of speech
regarding the assassination of ROBERT KENNEDY.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-73
(1964),

the Supreme Court set out to balance the interests of the

individual's reputation with the right to free speech under the
First Amendment.

The Court explained that freedom of speech upon

public matters is secured by the First Amendment.
269.

See id. at

However, because this freedom is not absolute, persons

injured by the abuse of that freedom can seek redress through a
defamation suit.

To insure that this remedy does not infringe

upon the defendant's First Amendment rights to speak out on
matters of public concern, however, the Court held that the
plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover damages.
at 283.

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323

5

See id.
(1974), the

Court limited the protection afforded defendants by the actual
malice standard to defamation of public figures.
When a defamation action is brought,

at 347.

the standard of proof

is determined by whether the plaintiff is a public or private
figure.

Gertz,

418 U.S. at 347.

To recover any damages, a

public figure must prove actual malice by the defendant.
at 349.

•

A plaintiff who is a private figure must prove actual

malice to receive presumed or punitive damages,

see id. at 347,

but need only prove negligence by the defendant to receive actual
damages, see Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.,
(1989).

Therefore,

48 Cal. 3d 711,

742

the determination of whether the plaintiff is

a private or public figure is central to a defamation action.
See Denney v. Lawrence,

22 Cal. App. 4th 927,

There are two kinds of pubic figures.

933

(1994).

A general public

figure is someone who has enough common notoriety that he or she
is a public figure in all matters of public concern.
418 U.S. at 351.

Se^ Gertz,

A limited purpose public figure is someone who

is part of a -particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues- relating to that
controversy.

Id. at 351.

The limited public figure attains such

status due to his or her own voluntary actions, or by being
-drawn into the particular public controversy- involuntarily.'

Id.
This Court has explained that the determination of public
figure status should rest upon -evidence of affirmative actions
by which purported 'public figures' have thrust themselves into
^ This Court has recognized the limited purpose public figure.
Reader's Digest Ass'n. Inc, v. Superior Court (Synanonl, 37 Cal, 3d
—254 (1984)(-we find that synanon should at the very least be
classified as a 'limited purpose' public figure for the purposes of
this general controversy-).

6

the forefront of particular controversies ....

[S]uch a

determination is often a close question which can only be
resolved by considering the totality of the circumstances which
comprise each individual controversy."
Inc. V. Superior Court

Reader*s Digest Ass'n,

(Synanon), 37 Cal. 3d 244, 254-55

Once public figure status is achieved,

it continues as long as

the issue creating the public status continues.

See Mosesian v.

McClatchy Newspapers, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1703
Moreover,

(1984).

(1991).

"the person remains a public figure thereafter for

purposes of later commentary on that controversy."

Id.

The standard of review this Court should use to determine
whether Khawar is a limited purpose public figure is de novo
because this is a mixed question of law and fact.
Cal. App. 4th 927,
(1987),

933.

See Denney, 22

In People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 985

the California Supreme Court explained how a mixed

question should be reviewed.
The review of mixed questions of law and fact can be divided
into a three-step process.

See id. at 985.

First, the court

must determine the facts in dispute, which calls for an abuse of
discretion standard.

See id.

Second, the court determines the

rule of law, which requires the de novo standard.

See id.

The

third step, where the court applies the facts to the law, may
require deference to the trial court in some situations, and may
require a continued de novo standard in others.
87.

See id. at 985-

If the application of the facts to the law requires inquiry

that is primarily factual then the substantial evidence standard
is used.

See id. at 987.

If the court has to "exercise judgment

about the values that animate legal principles* then the de novo
standard applies.

Id.

As the Court explained in Louis, de novo

7

review is favored in step three when the mixed question of law
and fact "implicates constitutional rights."
Louis cited Ker v. California,

Id-

374 U.S. 23

(1963),

in which

the United States Supreme Court held the mixed question of law
and fact in determining probable cause should be reviewed de novo
because the "inquiry involved [went] well beyond the facts of the
case and require[d] consideration of the abstract legal
principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence."
Cal. 3d at 987.

In this case,

Louis,

42

the mixed question implicates

First Amendment constitutional rights with regard to the amount
of protection that will be allotted to Globe for its speech.

The

standard of review for the application of the facts to the law in
this case should therefore be de novo.
A.

Because Khawar Voluntarily Placed Himself Near Kennedy
And Capitalized Upon His Photo Opportunity With The
Senator, Khawar Is A Public Figure For The Discussion
Of Matters Surrounding Rob^t Kennedy's Assassination.

In this case,

Khawar is a limited purpose public figure for

discussion surrounding his presence at Robert Kennedy's
assassination.

The trial court, and the court below, both

misapplied the law to the facts of the case to find otherwise.
In Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co.,

Inc.,

626 F.2d 1238

(5th Cir.

1980), the court dealt with a novel issue of defamation law.

The

court had to determine the classification of two people, married
to each other, as either public or private figures.
1241.

^ id^ at

The novelty was in the fact that one of the people, Anita

Brewer, had achieved her public figure status from an affair with
Elvis Presley years earlier.

See id^ at 1248.

Although Anita

Brewer never said she arranged pictures to be taken of herself
with Elvis Presley,

she did testify that "I don't think anyone

8

ever had to call anybody.

They (photographers) automatically

turned up.*

Press coverage of Anita's relationship

Id. at 1248.

was tied with coverage of her career as an entertainer.

See id.

More than ten years after the affair, Memphis Publishing
published a report that Anita had been in Las Vegas recently to
see Presley.

See id. at 1240.

The article insinuated that she

was there for a romantic meeting.
was married,

See id. at 1245.

filed the defamation action.

Anita, who

See id. at 1240.

In looking at Gertz for guidance, the Brewer court came to
the conclusion that this was a situation with which Gertz had not
dealt.

The court,

in determining that Anita was a public figure

with respect to discussions of Presley, explained that "Gertz did
not define all subcategories of the limited purpose public figure
classification."

Brewer,

626 F.2d at 1254.

Gertz dealt only

with the subcategory which applied to the plaintiff in that case.
See id.

The language used in Gertz indicates that other

subcategories of the limited purpose public figure exist, but
Gertz did not discuss them.^

See id.

"In describing the whole class of public figures the court
included those who seek public attention or whose achievements
gain notoriety, and commented that all public figures 'invite
attention and comment' and, later, that they 'assume special
prominence in the resolution of public questions.'" Id.

The

Brewer court agreed with Gertz that the determination of what is
a public question was too difficult and thus they would not
^ Brewer pointed to three examples of language indicating that Gertz
did not deal with all subcategories of the limited purpose public
figure. Gertz's use of the qualifiers "for the most part," "some,"
and "more commonly" all suggested that Gertz acknowledged the
existence of subcategories of limited purpose public figures beyond
people who involved themselves in public controversies like the
specific plaintiff in Gertz. Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1254.

9

attempt to answer it.

See id.

Therefore,

Brewer explained that

the primary focus should be on the plaintiff's actions in seeking
publicity and voluntarily engaging in activities that pose risk
of exposure to the public.

See id.

The fact that Anita was not

in the public eye at the time of publication did not reduce her
to a private figure because the article of defamation related *to
one cause of Anita's fame, her relationship with Presley."

Id.

at 1257.
The use of his voluntary interaction in the public matter of
Robert Kennedy's assassination brings Khawar into the realm of
the limited purpose public figure for all discussions of that
matter,

even though those discussions may not have been foreseen.

Khawar voluntarily placed himself in a position near Kennedy.
(R.T.

1340,

1389-90.)

Khawar took that position and gave his

camera to a friend so that a photo could be taken of him with the
Senator.

(R.T. 1340.)

Khawar knew that the press was taking

pictures of Kennedy and that he was likely to be in published
photos as a result of his proximity to Kennedy.
1345,

1348,

1389,

1390-91.)

(R.T.

1339,

This potential publicity did not

deter Khawar from maintaining his close proximity.
Khawar displayed the photo taken of himself and Kennedy
prominently in his office.

(R.T.

1357.)

Khawar hung the photo

so that anyone meeting him there could see it.

(R.T.

1358.)

Khawar left the photo on the wall of his office for over twenty
years and removed it only after the Globe article was published.
(R.T.

1357-58,

1423.)

Khawar was not a politician.

He did not intend his brush

with history to influence political matters.
that it influence others in his community.

10

But he did intend
Specifically, he left

the photo in a location where anyone who worked for him would see
it while in his office.

(R.T. 1358.)

This was "at least a

couple thousand" people according to Khawar.

(R.T. 1359: 9-12.)

This photo of himself with Senator Kennedy was not intended to
allow Khawar to influence other's politics, but it was used to
boost his own influence over his employees and people with whom
he did business.

The connection that the photo created between

Khawar and the senator suggested that Khawar was connected to
influential people,

just as the other photo in Khawar's office of

Khawar with President Zia of Pakistan did.

(R.T. 1358,

1422.)

Khawar used the public event to augment his own powers of
influence with the people he met in his office.
Khawar's actions present the type of unusual situation that
the Brewer court had to deal with and which the Gertz Court did
not.

There is no indication that either of the courts below even

considered the Brewer court's perspective.
however,

Such perspective,

is the proper analysis to apply when reviewing de novo

the application of the law to the facts in this case.

Khawar's

actions qualify him as a public figure with regard to the
assassination of Kennedy because he used his brush with Kennedy
on the night of the assassination to gain himself a piece of
notoriety and to create the illusion of influence by association.
Just as Anita Brewer was a public figure because of the regional
notoriety she gained from her affair with Elvis Presley,
Brewer,

see

626 F.2d at 1253-54, Khawar is also a public figure

because he capitalized on his photo opportunity with Senator
Kennedy.
Additionally, Brewer is analogous with this case in that the
court considered Anita to be a public figure for only the limited
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purpose of discussion regarding her relationship with Presley.
See Brewer,

626 F.2d at 1257.

In this case. Globe's article

dealt specifically with Khawar's relationship to Robert Kennedy
on the night their paths crossed.

Therefore Khawar is still a

public figure for that limited purpose.
As Brewer explained,

the rationale of Gert^ extends beyond

those who use notoriety to influence politics and covers those
who chance whatever fame they can get,

in whatever manner they

can get it, to use it for their own purposes.
F.2d at 1254-55.

Brewer,

626

Khawar presents this Court with such a case and

therefore should be classified as a public figure for all speech
regarding the night he sought out his piece of notoriety:

the

night of Robert Kennedy's assassination.
B.

Khawar .ghnuld Be Classified As A Public Figure Fo_r
Speech Regarding The Assassination Of Ro^t Kennedy
To Insure That Speech On Matters Of Public Concern
Remains Open.

The purpose of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution goes beyond the principle that free citizens should
be able to speak freely.

'The First Amendment was fashioned to

assure unfettered interchange of ideas.”
V. Greenmoss Builders.

Inc.,

Roth V. United States,

354 U.S. 476,

Dun & Bradstreet,

472 U.S. 749,
484

759

Inc.

{1985) (quoting

(1957)).

The freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is
not just a right, but one of the pillars upon which the Framers
intended this society to stand.

^ Sullivan,

376 U.S. at 270.

It insures that the electorate is informed on matters of public
concern.

The protection of speech on matters of public concern

is the core of the First Amendment.
at 258-59

Dun & Bradstreet,

(citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
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472 U.S.

435 U.S. 765, 776

(1978)).

This is because *[s]peech concerning public affairs is

more than self expression; it is the essence of self government."
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)),

(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana^

Therefore, speech on public matters

is "entitled to special protection" under the First Amendment.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913

(quoting NAACP v. Clairborne

(1980)).

In Rosenbloom V. Metromedia,

Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43

(1971), Justice Brennan applied the above principles and purpose
of the First Amendment to reject a defamation suit.

"Freedom of

discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period."

Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102

(1940)).

(quoting

To determine

what speech garners the fullest protection of the First
Amendment, Justice Brennan drew the line at the matter spoken of
itself.

Justice Brennan's logic was straightforward:

if the

purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech regarding
matters of public concern,

then draw the line in the protection

of speech between matters of public concern and matters of
private concern.

Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 43.

The Court in Gertz broke with Justice Brennan's logic and
held that in defamation actions the courts must determine whether
the defamed person is a public or private figure.
U.S. at 343,

See Gertz, 418

This was a concession to the reputational interest

of the individual.

Justice Brennan's reasoning, however, showed

how the Gertz Court's focus on the individual,

instead of the

matter, may undermine the purpose of the First Amendment.
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If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content,
effect, and significance of the conduct, not the
participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S, at 43.
The assassination of a United States senator who was favored
as the next President,
concern.

See id. at 43

is without a doubt a matter of public
{a "community has a vital interest in the

proper enforcement of its criminal laws") .

Extending Gertz s

concession to the individual's reputational interest to the
extent that it denies speakers the full protection of the First
Amendment in this case would undercut the purpose of the First
Amendment.

The court decides whether the defamed is a private or

public figure in determining the protection the defendant will be
afforded by the First Amendment.
However,

See Gertz,

418 U.S. at 343.

the court should also consider the importance of the

subject matter in the defamation itself in deciding whether the
defamed is a public or private figure.

This insures that Justice

Brennan's criticism that Gertz will result in arbitrary
distinctions affecting First Amendment protections will not hold
to be true.
The fact that the accusation in this case turned out to be
false should not lead this Court to allocate less than full First
Amendment protection because
some abuse of First Amendment freedoms is tolerated only to
insure that would-be commentators on events of public or
general interest are not 'deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can
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t

be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so. '
Gertz,

418 U.S. at 365

(Brennan, J., dissenting){quoting

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
Because Khawar intentionally placed himself near Kennedy on
the night of the assassination and later used that photo
opportunity to augment his personal influence, Khawar is a
limited purpose public figure.

Furthermore, in accordance with

the purpose of the First Amendment to keep the pubic informed on
matters of public concern, Khawar should be ruled a public figure
for speech regarding the assassination of Robert Kennedy.
Therefore,

this case should be remanded to the court below to

enter judgment in accordance with the finding that Khawar is a
limited purpose public figure.
II.

THE APPELLATE COURT'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE A
CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
VIOLATED GLOBE'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
At common law, one who republished the defamatory statements

of another was considered as equally liable for defamation as the
original defamer.
(1977).

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578

Dissatisfaction with this harsh rule of strict

liability, however,
privileges.^

led to the development of various

One such privilege was established in the landmark

case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

in which the Supreme

Court held that public official plaintiffs could only establish

"Voluntary consent" by the defamed grants an absolute privilege to
the defamer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977). The
"privilege of fair comment' grants the news media a conditional
privilege to publish defamatory opinions on matters of public
concern, where the opinion is that of the publisher, and is not
published solely to harm the defamed individual. I^ at § 566. The
'privilege of fair report" grants publishers a privilege to publish
accurate accounts of official actions or proceedings.
Id. at § 611.
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defamation liability by proving that the defendant acted with
-actual malice,* that is,

that the defendant either knew that the

defamatory statement was false or acted with a reckless disregard
as to its falsity.
279-80 (1964).

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254,

The Court explained that some defamatory speech

must be permitted to avoid -chilling" speech that the
constitution was designed to protect.

Id. at 271-72.

In

addition, the Court noted that false statements are -inevitablein free debate, and must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the -breathing space" that they need to
survive.

I^ (quoting NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415,

435

(1963)).

In explaining its departure from the common law rule,

the Court noted that its decision had been formulated -against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
wide-open .

.

In 1977,

.

Sullivan,

robust and

376 U.S. at 279-80.

the Second Circuit created yet another

constitutionally-based privilege which it termed the -neutral
reportage privilege."
Inc.,

556 F.2d 113,

120

See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
(2d Cir.

1977).

The Edwards privilege

protects the news media's neutral and accurate republication of
newsworthy defamatory statements when made by a responsible and
prominent organization about a public figure, even if the
reporter knows that the defamatory statements are false.

See

The Edwards court explained that, under the First Amendment,
-[t]he public interest in being fully informed about
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
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without assuming responsibility for them."

Id.

Thus, the

Edwards court created a constitutionally-based privilege that
granted republishers of defamatory statements even more
protection than that provided by the Supreme Court in Sullivan.
The neutral reportage privilege provides a type of
protection distinct from that provided by Sullivan's "actual
malice" standard.

The privilege articulated by the Supreme Court

in Sullivan protects publishers of defamatory statements who do
not publish with knowledge that the defamatory statements are
false or with a reckless disregard as to their falsity.
Sullivan,

376 U.S. at 279-80.

See

Conversely, the neutral reportage

privilege protects republishers of defamatory statements
regardless of the republisher's knowledge of or concern for the
statements' validity.
reportage privilege,

S^ Edwards,

556 F.2d at 120.

The neutral

therefore, protects republishers who may

possess actual malice under the Sullivan test.

Thus, the neutral

reportage privilege and the Sullivan privilege are complimentary.
A.

Neither The Supreme Court Nor Any California State
Court Has Addressed The Neutral Reportage Privilege.

The Supreme Court has never explicitly reviewed the neutral
reportage privilege.

See Scott Saef, Neutral Reportage:

Case for a Statutory Privilege,
(1992).

The

86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 419 n.l7

In 1989, however. Justice Blackmun criticized a

defendant's decision to "eshew[] any reliance on the 'neutral
reportage defense,'" a "strategic decision" that "appear[ed]

to

have been unwise in light of the facts of th[at] case."

Harte-

Hanks Communications,

694-95

(1989)

Inc, v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,

(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Justice Blackmun commented:

“Were this Court to adopt the neutral reportage theory,
of this case arguably might fit within it."

Id.

the facts

Justice

Blackmun's comments thus indicate that the Supreme Court may look
favorably on the neutral reportage privilege.
California State courts have likewise never addressed
whether the neutral reportage privilege exists in this state.
See formerly published at Khawar v. Globe Int^1,
Rptr. 2d 92.

102-03

(1996).

Inc.,

54 Cal.

The United States District Courts

for both the Northern and Central Districts of California,
however, have adopted the neutral reportage privilege.

See Bar^

V. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984),- see also
Ward v. News Group Int^l Ltd., 733 F. Supp.
1990).

83,

86

(C.D. Cal.

Whether Globe is entitled to invoke the neutral reportage

privilege under the facts of this case is a mixed question of law
and fact that implicates Globe's constitutional rights.
Therefore,

this Court should review the appellate court's finding

on this issue de novo.

See People v. Louis,

42 Cal. 3d 969,

987

(1987).
The Edwards court adopted merely one of the various
formulations of the neutral reportage privilege.

The privilege

has since met with varied judicial receptivity in other
jurisdictions.

Several courts have adopted various formulations

of the Edwards privilege, while others have declined to do so for
three primary reasons.

First,

courts have criticized the Edwards

privilege on the grounds that its focus on the subject matter of
the defamation runs afoul of Supreme Court defamation
jurisprudence.

See Dickey v. CBS Inc.,
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583 F.2d 1221,

1229

(3rd

Cir.

1978) ,

Second, defamation jurisprudence has traditionally

held that defamatory speech is not protected by the First
Amendment.

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72

(1942); see also Dorothy A. Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a
Defense Against Republishing Libel, 11 Comm. & L. 3, 9

(Mar.

1989) (arguing that "the lack of a uniformily accepted theoretical
basis for the doctrine has resulted in its uneven application*).
Third,

courts have rejected the Edwards privilege on the grounds

that it underprotects plaintiffs' reputational interests.

See

Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 478 (1982)(arguing that
Edwards "upset" the balance of rights previously established by
the Supreme Court in Sullivan and Gertz).
Notably, these courts have rejected Edwards' formulation of
the neutral reportage privilege.

This Court, however, has the

ability to adopt its own formulation of the privilege.

Indeed,

this case represents the perfect opportunity for this Court to
adopt a formulation of the neutral reportage privilege that is
immune from the concerns of the courts that have rejected other
formulations of the privilege.
B.

The Neutral Reportage Privilege Proposed By Globe
Ameliorates The Concerns Voiced By Courts Which Have
Rejected Other Formulations Of The Privilege.

This court should adopt a constitutionally-based privilege
of neutral reportage that protects the news media from defamation
liability when it republishes defamatory statements where:

(1)

the defamatory statements involve a matter of public concern;

(2)

the defamatory statements are made by, or about a public figure;
(3)

the republication is an accurate and neutral account of the
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defamatory statements; and (4)
by a prominent source.

the defamatory statements are made

This formulation of the neutral reportage

privilege comports with the current focus of the Supreme Court's
constitutional defamation analysis, protects only that category
of speech that warrants First Amendment protection, and provides
a reasonable degree of protection to the reputational interests
of plaintiffs like Khawar.

Thus, Globe's formulation of the

neutral reportage privilege addresses the concerns of courts that
have rejected other formulations of the privilege.
Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege
comports with the current focus of the Supreme Court's current
defamation jurisprudence.

Since Gertz,

the Supreme Court has

refocused its defamation analysis once again on the content of
the allegedly defamatory speech,

in effect reviving the subject

matter test first implemented in Rosenbloom and later repudiated
in Gertz.
In Landmark Communications,

Inc, v. Virginia,

435 U.S. 829,

839 (1978), the Court overturned a criminal sanction that had
been imposed on a newspaper because the paper had published
material of utmost public concern.

The Court has also allowed a

private figure to recover presumed damages from a defendant
without showing actual malice where the false and defamatory
speech did not discuss a matter of public concern.
Bradstreet,

Inc, v. Greenmoss Builders,

Inc.,

(1985); see also Philadelphia Newspapers,
767, 775

See Dun &

472 U.S. 749, 763

Inc, v. Hepps,

475 U.S.

(1986)(holding that plaintiffs must overcome a higher

standard of liability when the defamatory speech involves a
matter of public concern).

Moreover,
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the Court has explained

that in situations involving media defendants, a plaintiff must
prove the falsity of statements on matters of public concern
before liability arises under state defamation law.

See

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20

(1990).

These rulings clearly undercut the Gertz Court's reasoning
that courts should not bear the burden of making qualitative,
subject matter determinations.
418 U.S. 323,

346

(1974).

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

In addition, these opinions indicate

that the public concern/private concern subject matter
distinction remains a viable doctrine under the First Amendment
for protecting the republication of defamatory speech.
Bowles,

supra,

11 Comm. & L. at 9-

See

Globe's formulation of the

neutral reportage privilege focuses on the subject matter of the
defamation,

thereby bringing it in line with the current focus of

the Supreme Court's defamation jurisprudence.
In light of the Supreme Court's renewed focus on the subject
matter of the defamation,

the Edwards formulation of the neutral

reportage privilege is in line with the Court's current focus to
the extent that it focuses on the newsworthiness of the
defamation.

See Edwards,

556 F.2d at 120.

Both courts and

commentators, however, have rejected the Edwards formulation of
the neutral reportage privilege on the grounds that this
newsworthiness standard is “broader than necessary to serve the
purposes of the First Amendment."

Justin Wertman, The

Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral Reportage
is a Matter of Public Concern. 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789,
(1996).
however,

816

Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege,
is immune from this concern precisely because it
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proposes a narrower standard designed to protect only that type
of speech that truly warrants First Amendment protection.

C.

Limiting The Protection Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege To The Republication Of Defamatory Statements^
That Involve Matters Of "Public Concern*^ Ensures That
The Privilege Protects Only That Type Of Speech That Is
Protected By The First Amendment.

The neutral reportage privilege proposed by Globe would
protect only that category of republished defamation that
involves a matter of public concern,

thereby ensuring that only

speech that falls squarely within the protection of the First
Amendment is protected.

The Supreme Court has recognized that

not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.
Bradstreet,

472 U.S. at 758.

However,

See Dun &

the Court has repeatedly

explained that matters of public concern rest at the heart of the
First Amendment's protection.
78; Dun & Bradstreet,
Bellotti,

See,

e.g., Hepps,

475 U.S. at 775-

472 U.S. at 755-57; First Nat'l Bank y_._

435 U.S. 765, 776

(1978); Sullivan,

376 U.S. at 269-70.

In Connic)c v. Myers, the Court recognized matters of public
concern as a "content-based category of privileged 'public issue'
speech protected by the First Amendment."
Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
First Amendment Category,
Connick,

Cynthia L. Estlund,

The Perils of an Emerging

59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

1,

2

(1990).

In

the Court held that Myers had not raised a

constitutional claim because the speech at issue did not involve
a matter of public concern.
154

See Connick v. Myers,

(1983) .
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461 U.S. 138,

The Court has similarly recognized the value of speech
involving matters of public concern in the defamation context.
See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-762.

In Dun, the Court

echoed the majority opinion in Connick in holding that matters of
private concern do not implicate the First Amendment where
private figure plaintiffs are involved.

See id.

Thus, by

limiting its protection to speech that involves a matter of
public concern. Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage
privilege encompasses only that type of speech that is truly
deserving of First Amendment protection.
D.

The Neutral Reportage Privilege Proposed By Globe
Adequately Protects The Reputational Interests Of
Plaintiffs Like Khawar.

In the neutral reportage context,
compete for supremacy:

two recognized rights

(1) the plaintiff's right to protect his

or her reputation; and (2)

the news media's constitutional right

to republish certain types of defamatory speech.

The court below

used misguided analysis to balance these two interests.

The

court below cited this Court's analysis in Brown v. Kelly Broad.,
interpreting this analysis as holding that the "news media must
not be privileged to report in a way which may unreasonably
undermine individual rights because a 'reasonable degree of
protection for a private individual's reputation is essential to
our system of ordered liberty.'"

Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104

(quoting Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 743
(1989))(emphasis added).

While the analysis in Brown may have

been instructive, it should not have been dispositive because in
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Brown,

this Court was not considering the neutral reportage

privilege.
In Brown,

this Court was balancing the reputational

interests of plaintiffs against the news media's right to publish
defamatory statements under section 47(3) of the California Civil
Code.

See id. at 711.

The court below failed to recognize the

highly significant differences between these two privileges.

The

privilege afforded by section 47(3) protects the news media when
it republishes a defamatory communication "without malice on
occasions in which the speaker and the recipient of the
communication share a common interest."

contrast,

the

neutral reportage privilege protects the republication of
defamatory statements in certain situations without regard to
whether the republisher acted with "actual malice" in the
Sullivan sense.

Therefore, while the court below properly

included a balancing of these competing interests in its
analysis,

it improperly relied on this court's reasoning in Brown

to find that a plaintiff's interest in protecting his or her

reputation outweighs the news media's First Amendment interest in
republishing defamatory statements under any formulation of the
neutral reportage privilege.
An appropriate balancing analysis, on the other hand,
reveals that Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage
privilege provides a reasonable degree of protection to
plaintiffs' reputations.

Whenever the news media invokes the

neutral reportage privilege to republish speech deserving of
First Amendment protection, the reputations of plaintiffs like
Khawar will arguably suffer.

However, the First Amendment
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freedoms of speech and press could not exist if the state placed
greater importance on the reputational interests of the
occasional individual who may be harmed.
at 122.

See Edwards, 556 F.2d

The Supreme Court has likewise observed that “[tlhe risk

of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."
Time,

Inc, v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).

While a

plaintiff's reputation may suffer, however, each of the
requirements that must be met to invoke Globe's formulation of
the neutral reportage privilege serves to mitigate this harm,
thereby affording the plaintiff's reputation a reasonable degree
of protection.
As explained,

requiring that republished allegations involve

a matter of public concern ensures that republishers will be able
to invoke the neutral reportage privilege only when its
protection is truly warranted by the First Amendment.

Thus, the

privilege proposed by Globe ensures that the defamatory
allegations are republished for a purpose other than to injure
the plaintiff's reputation.

Similarly, requiring that the

defamatory statements be made by or about a public figure
increases the probability that the republished allegations
involve matters of public concern.

Requiring the republication

to be a neutral and accurate account of the defamatory statements
likewise protects plaintiffs' reputations by ensuring that the
media will not be protected when it attempts to launch its own
defamatory attacks under the guise of informing the public about
matters of public concern.

Finally, requiring that the

defamatory statements be made by a prominent source increases the
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likelihood that the accusations are true,

and if false, at least

limits the privilege to speech that the public has a strong
interest in hearing.

Thus,

the individual requirements that must

be met to invoke Globe's formulation of the privilege ensure
that, given the overriding importance of the media's First
Amendment interests, plaintiffs' reputations are provided a
reasonable degree of protection.
Other practical considerations provide reputational
protection in addition to that provided by Globe's formulation of
the neutral reportage privilege.

Plaintiffs are not left without

a remedy when the news media invokes the neutral reportage
privilege.

Globe proposes a privilege that in no way precludes

plaintiffs like Khawar from bringing a defamation action against
the original defamer.

While the news media may arguably magnify

the potential for reputational harm by republishing defamatory
statements,

the original defamer remains liable for the full

extent of any reasonably foreseeable harm.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 576

(1977).

See RESTATEMENT

Neither does the neutral

reportage privilege proposed by Globe preclude plaintiffs like
Khawar from using the media to rebut the defamatory charges.
Indeed, Khawar conducted a televised interview in which he denied
any involvement in Senator Kennedy's assassination.

(R.T.

881.)

These practical considerations further indicate that plaintiffs
in Khawar's situation are provided with a reasonable degree of
reputational protection.
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E.

Globe Met Every Requirement Necessary To Invoke The

Proposed Formulation Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege.
The Globe article republished speech that involved a matter
of public concern.

The Supreme Court has explained that matters

of public concern include *all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to cope with the exigencies of .
period."

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102

.

,

[the]

(1940).

Moreover, matters that concern the governing of the nation are
properly characterized as of public concern.

See Alexander

Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 245,

256.

The Globe article reported on a controversy that

both concerned the governing of our nation and created widespread
public interest in resolving the controversy.

Thus, the Globe

article touched a matter of public concern.
The Globe article reported on a controversy that concerned
the governing of our nation.

Political assassinations represent

a grave and direct threat to the free election system that
represents one of the basic tenants of our democratic political
system.

A controversy that involves such dire implications is

just the sort of periodic exigency that the Supreme Court thought
justified the need for public information and education.
Thornhill,

310 U.S. at 102.

See

Moreover, the record indicates that

Senator Kennedy's assassination created international public
interest.

(R.T. 690-91.)

In addition, the California State

Archives assembled a collection of approximately 60,000 documents
related to both the assassination and the subsequent
investigations of the FBI and various police departments.
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(R.T.

Such facts indicate that the public has a legitimate and

692.)

widespread interest in resolving this controversy.

Senator

Kennedy's assassination and the resulting investigation it
produced related to the governing of the nation and created
widespread public interest.

Thus the Globe article reported on a

matter of public concern.
The defamatory statements in the Globe article were made by
or about a public figure.

As explained in section I,

Khawar,

the

target of the defamatory statements, was a limited purpose public
figure.

Thus,

this requirement is satisfied.

However,

if this

Court determines that Khawar is not a public figure for the
purposes of this appeal, this requirement is still satisfied
because Morrow,

the source of the defamatory statements, was a

limited purpose public figure as well.
The Supreme Court has explained that an individual who
voluntarily injects himself into, or engages the public's
attention to influence the outcome of a particular public
controversy thereby becomes a public figure with respect to a
limited range of issues relating to that controversy.
418 U.S. at 351-52.

See Gertz,

Morrow sought to inject himself into the

controversy surrounding Senator Kennedy's assassination by
writing a book about it.

(R-T. 704-705.)

Morrow likewise

attempted to influence the outcome of this controversy by using
his book to promulgate an alternative theory about the identity
of Kennedy's true assassin.

See id.

Moreover, while

participating in a panel discussion held at an assassination
researcher's conference. Morrow expounded upon the theories
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articulated in his book.

(R.T. 2149-51.)

Morrow's actions show

that he voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy to
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence the
controversy's outcome, thereby rendering himself a limited
purpose public figure under the test enunciated in Gertz.
The record likewise indicates that the Globe article was a
neutral account of the charges alleged by Morrow.

The Globe

article expressly stated that the charges it was recounting were
made by Morrow.

(R.T. 3145.)

Moreover, on cross-examination,

Khawar's own expert witness agreed that the article's pervasive
use of disclaiming phrases served to inform readers that Globe
was not standing behind the charges that it was reporting on, but
was merely reporting that the charges were made by another
individual.

(R.T. 859-63.)

Furthermore, Blackburn, the author

of the article, attempted to contact Ali Ahmand, the individual
Morrow names as Kennedy's true assassin in his book.
22.)

(R.T. 1121-

Thus, under even the most exacting definition of “neutral

reporting," the record indicates that the Globe article was a
neutral account of the charges alleged by Morrow.
The Globe article similarly constituted an accurate account
of the charges alleged by Morrow.

The record indicates that in

preparing to write the article, Blackburn interviewed Morrow and
read Morrow's book thoroughly.

(R.T. 1092, 1101.)

Blackburn

likewise repeatedly asserted that the statements in the Globe
article were direct quotes either from Morrow's book, or from
what Morrow told Blackburn during the interview.
1108-10.)

Thus,

(R.T. 1104-05,

the precautions Blackburn took in writing the
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Globe article indicate that the article represented an accurate
account of the charges made by Morrow.
The defamatory statements at issue were made by a prominent
source.

For the purposes of invoking Globe's formulation of the

neutral reportage privilege. Morrow should be considered a
prominent source of the defamatory statements republished in the
Globe article.

Morrow has written three books on the

assassinations of former United States political leaders.
704,

841,

883.)

In fact,

first book. Betrayal,

(R.T.

the information contained in Morrow's

coupled with additional confidential

information Morrow supplied to Congressman Downing,

"helped make

the creation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations
possible."

(R.T. 843.)

Moreover, both Morrow and his third

book. Firsthand Knowledge, were featured on both a nationally
syndicated television program and a news program in Cincinnati.
(R.T. 883-84,

1600.)

Furthermore, Morrow had run for Congress in

Maryland and was acquainted with such prominent political leaders
as Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and former FBI director
Clarence Kelly.

(R.T. 883-84.)

Finally,

there is evidence that

suggests that Morrow has done work for the CIA.
These facts indicate that,

(R.T. 847.)

in the context of commentating on

government and political assassinations. Morrow should be
considered a prominent source.
The court below violated Globe's First Amendment rights by
refusing to recognize a neutral reportage privilege that would
shield Globe from defamation liability under the facts of this
case.

Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege
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comports with current Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence,
protects only that type of speech deserving of First Amendment
protection, and provides the reputational interests of plaintiffs
like Khawar a reasonable degree of protection.

For these

reasons. Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege
ameliorates the concerns of other courts that have rejected the
Edwards privilege.

Finally, Globe met every requirement

necessary to invoke its formulation of the neutral reportage
privilege.

Therefore this Court should adopt Globe's formulation

of the neutral reportage doctrine and reverse the judgment of the
court below.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE UNWARRANTED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE
GLOBE'S ACTIONS DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ACTUAL
MALICE STANDARD.
Because the trier of fact in a defamation action must find
actual malice by clear and convincing proof, and not by just a
preponderance of the evidence, the reviewing court independently
reviews the lower court's award of punitive damages.

See McCoy

V. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 842 (1986).
The question of whether the evidence in the record in a
defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to
strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not
merely a question for the trier of fact.
Judges, as
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross
the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any
judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof
of 'actual malice.'
at 842
States,

(quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United

Inc.,

466 U.S. 485,

510-11
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(1984)).

In making its review,

the court “must independently review

all the evidence presented on the issue of actual malice.

It may

not restrict itself ... to evidence favorable to the judgment."
McCoy,

42 Cal. 3d at 845.

Unlike substantial evidence review,

the independent review done by the court may "involve review of
evidence which ,

,

. would be considered 'discredited' under

usual rules of appellate review by virtue of the jury verdict in
favor of respondents."

Id. at 845-46,

The reviewing court does

not have to consider actual malice evidence "in the light most
favorable to respondents or [] draw all permissible inferences in
favor of respondents."
court may .

.

Id. at 846.

"Finally,

if warranted,

this

. substitute its own inferences on the issue of

actual malice for those drawn by tbe trier of fact."

Id.

A public figure can only recover damages in a defamation
suit if he or she can prove actual malice by the defendant.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254,

280-81

Because defamation is a constitutional standard,

Furthermore,

in Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc.,

(1964).

the evidence

must prove actual malice with "convincing clarity."
86.

See

Id. at 285-

418 U.S.

323,

the Court held that a private figure need not show actual malice
to recover compensatory/actual damages, but still had to show
actual malice under Sullivan to recover punitive damages.
Gertz,

See

418 U.S. at 349.

Actual malice,exists if the defendant knows that a statement
is false, or recklessly disregards whether the statement is false
or not.

S^ Sullivan,

376 U.S. at 280-81.

The plaintiff must

^ The substitution of the court's own inferences is particularly
suitable for cases where key witnesses failed to testify at trial and
their testimony was only offered through deposition records.
See
McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 846, n.8.
In this case, Blac)cburn's testimony
is entirely from video-taped deposition.
(R.T. 1077.)
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provide clear and convincing proof of the defendant's knowledge
or reckless disregard.

See McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 860.

The

Sullivan court held that failure to discover the falsity of
statements could show negligence, but is insufficient to prove
actual malice.

376 U.S. at 287-88.

A showing of actual malice

requires sufficient evidence to allow the conclusion that the
defendant actually had serious doubts about the truth of the
publication.
(1968).

See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731

Publication of allegations:

(1) without "personal

knowledge" of the plaintiff's activities;

(2) based on

information from a source for whom there is no evidence showing
veracity; and (3) after failing "to verify the information with
those .

.

. who might have known the facts," does not establish

actual malice even when all three of those factors exist
together.

Id. at 730.

Moreover,

"mere proof of failure to

investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard
for the truth."

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.

In this case, there is insufficient evidence to show that
Globe had a subjective knowledge that Morrow's accusation was
false, or that Globe recklessly disregarded whether Morrow's
accusation was false.

Therefore, there is insufficient evidence

that Globe published the article with actual malice.
A.

Blackburn's Lack Of Credibility Does Not Prove Actual
Malice.
"

The process of independent review requires this Court to
look at all of the evidence of actual malice together.
McCoy,

42 Cal. 3d at 845-46.

See

Even if the reviewing court agrees

with the trier of fact's likely assessment that a witness is not
credible,

the court may still decline to infer from that
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witness's testimony the presence of actual malice upon its
independent review.
Connauighton/

See Harte~Hanks Communications,

491 U.S. 657,

689, n.35

(1989).

Inc, v.

The United States

Supreime Court's analysis in Bose is a clear example of such an
appli-cation of independent review.
In Bose,

See Bose,

466 U.S. at 511-12.

the trial court found that the author of the report at

issue was not credible.
determination; however,

Id.

The Court accepted that

the Court was unwilling to infer actual

malice from that witness's refusal to admit his earlier mistake
and reversed the trial court and appellate court's findings of
actual malice.

See id.

As Bose demonstrates, under independent

review, a court may not dismiss the trier of fact's credibility
assessments, but the reviewing court need not bend to them in
their determination of actual malice either.
In this case,

the only direct evidence as to Globe's

subjective knowledge of falsity or knowing recklessness was the
videotaped deposition of the article's original writer, John
BlacBcburn.''

The court below believed that the jury had reason to

find that Blackburn was not credible.
Khawar v. Globe Int'l,

Inc.,

See formerly published at

54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92,

106

(1996).

This determination, however, was not determinative in the
ind^endent review of whether there is clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice.

See Bose,

466 U.S. at 511-13.

The

determination that Blackburn is not credible does not establish
actual malice for two reasons.

First,

"discredited testimony is

not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary
’ Khawar is likely to cite language from St. Amant where the Court
indicated that "inherently improbable" allegations may be
circumstantial evidence of actual malice.
390 U.S. at 732.
'The idea
that an accomplice to a murder could have gone unapprehended is not a
reckless one.
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conclusion."

Bose, 466 U.S. at 512

and Ohio R.R. ,

(citing Moore v. Chesapeake

340 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1951)).

fact may disregard Blackburn's testimony,

While the trier of

it may not use that

discredited testimony to infer the opposite.

Therefore, the

trier of fact cannot use Blackburn's discredited testimony that
he did not know or suspect the falsity of Morrow's accusations to
conclude that Blackburn in fact did know or suspect such falsity.
Second,

the fact that a witness made an attempt to defend

his mistake by asserting that it was not a mistake "does not
establish that he realized the inaccuracy at the time of
publication."

Bose, 466 U.S. at 512.

Blackburn tried to explain

that he only took notes from interviews of people he intended to
use in a story.

(R.T. 1140-42.)

Blackburn was unsure whether he

might have contacted people associated with the assassination.
(R.T.

1123,

1127,

1140.)

The trier of fact may have considered

this testimony to be a weak attempt to cover a mistake Blackburn
realized at the time of the deposition, but realization at the
deposition does not equal realization of the "inaccuracy at the
time of the publication," which is required for actual malice.
Bose,

644 U.S. at 512.

Similarly, there was a publication of

inaccurate information in this case; however, as in Bose, that
inaccuracy alone is not enough evidence to meet the
constitutional standard of clear and convincing proof of actual
malice by Globe.
B.

See id. at 511-513.

Failure To Locate Khawar Was Not Purposeful Avoidance
And Therefore Did Not Constitute Actual Malice.

A plaintiff may show actual malice by a defendant if the
defendant purposefully avoided learning facts that might confirm
the probable falsity of the statements.

35

See Harte-Hanks, 491

U.s. at 692.

Harte-Hanks provides an example of what constitutes

"purposeful avoidance."

In Harte-Hanks, a prosecutor

(Connaughton) was accused of bribing witnesses testifying before
See id. at 657.

a grand jury.

Connaughton was a candidate for

the municipal bench at that time and the Journal News,
in the action, supported the incumbent judge.

defendant

See id.

Connaughton sued the Journal News for defamation upon their
publication of accusations by a grand jury witness that
Connaughton had offered her and her sister
and a trip to Florida 'in appreciation'
investigation."

Id.

(Patsy Stephens)

"jobs

for their help in the

In its examination of the record for actual

malice by Journal News,

the Court pointed to two facts which

indicated "purposeful avoidance" by Journal News.

Id■ at 692.

First, even though Connaughton made them available, no one at
Journal News bothered to listen to the tapes of Connaughton's
interviews with the key witness,
Stephens.

See id.

Second,

and accuser's sister,

Patsy

even though Journal News knew Patsy

Stephens was the key witness in the case the paper never
attempted to interview her.

See id.

The Court held that this

evidence was sufficient to show "purposeful avoidance" and thus,
actual malice.

Id. at 692-93.

In contrast. Globe's actions do not show purposeful
avoidance.

In this case, Globe's access to Khawar was not as

easy as that of Journal News' to Patsy Stephens in Harte-Hanks.
While Journal News knew Patsy Stephens' real name. Globe did not
know Khawar's.

(R.T.

1122-23.)

The man identified in photos as

Khawar was listed in Morrow's book as Ali Ahmand.
C.T. 3145.)
Khalid Iqbal,

(R.T.

1357;

Khawar chose to give his name to the FBI and LAPD as
(R.T. 1383), even though his full name is Khalid
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Iqbal Khawar,

(R.T. 1329).

As a result, Morrow's book did not

contain Khawar's last name, but simply listed Ali Ahmand as also
having the name Khalid Iqbal.

(R.T. 1123.)

Tracking down Khawar

in this case is clearly not the simple task which Journal News
passed up in affirmatively deciding not to interview Patsy
Stephens.®

Another factor distinguishes Globe's actions from

that of Journal News.

While the defamed in Harte-Hanks offered

Journal News evidence of his innocence, no such evidence was
offered to or rejected by Globe.®

Globe did not purposefully

avoid finding facts that would show Morrow's accusations were
false.

Rather, Globe simply did not investigate Morrow's claims,

which is insufficient to support a finding of actual malice.
Harte-Hanks,

See

491 U.S. at 692.

In Antonovich v. Superior Court (Schwellenbach), 234 Cal.
App. 3d 1041

(1992),

the court dealt with a case of defamation

stemming from comments made by Antonovich that Ward had destroyed
necessary files the day he handed over the supervisor's office to
Antonovich.

See id. at 1045-46.

In holding that Antonovich had

acted with actual malice, the court pointed specifically to
Antonovich's refusal to accept Ward's offer to investigate the
allegation as "a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of
facts that might confirm the probable falsity of
charges."

Id. at 1053.

[the subject]

This amounted to a "purposeful avoidance

® It should be noted that there is no requirement that a defendant
even obtain a plaintiff's version of a story before publication. See
Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 147 (1980).
The public, and therefore Globe, did have access to the archives on
the RFK assassination, however, those archives total over 60,000
documents and other exhibits.
(R.T. 692.) The incredible size of
such a record is not even comparable to the limited number of audio
tapes Connaughton provided for Journal News in Harte-Hanks and it is
therefore unrealistic to classify a failure to search the entire RFK
archive as purposeful avoidance.
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Id,

of the truth** and supported "a finding of actual malice.
1053.

In this case,

at

the record shows no such affirmative

evidence that Globe declined to investigate Morrow's claims.

The

record shows only that Globe did not investigate, which under
Gertz is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

See

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
There is no evidence that Globe declined any offer or
request to investigate Morrow's accusations.

There is no

evidence that Globe decided not to interview Khawar in order to
avoid finding evidence of inaccuracy in Morrow's book, but rather
that Globe simply could not locate Khawar.

(R.T.

1120-22.)

There is no evidence of subjective knowledge of falsity,

or

reckless disregard for the truth by Globe at the time of
publication either.

Because clear and convincing evidence is not

present to find actual malice by Globe,
damages must be reversed.

See McCoy,

the award of punitive

42 Cal.

3d at 860.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Globe respectfully requests that
the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's
decision be reversed and remanded.
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